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of supplemental authority, pertinent to this action, not previously cited by either party.
In Qlson__y._Reagen (S.D. Iowa
1986) 669 F.Supp. 282, 283, the United States District Court
granted a motion for summary judgment which declared that the
denial of Medicaid eligibility based on sibling income is a
violation of the Social Security Act. This decision is pertinent
to arguments made at pages 17 and 18 of the Appellants Brief.
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Wallace (M.D. Ala. 1987) 652 F.Supp. 301.
These decisions are
pertinent to arguments made at pages 1 7 and 18 of the Appellant's
Brief.
A third decision supports arguments made by the respondent.
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Court reversed a District Court decision which had declared the
income deeming to be in violation of the Social Security Act.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This action is an appeal from a decision rendered by the
Seventh Judicial District Court on a Petition
Final

Determination

For

Review

of

a

made by the Director of the Utah Department

of Health on a Medicaid application.

The Court of

Appeals

has

jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(a).

STATEMENT OF REPLY ISSUES
1.

Whether the federal statute which bars the
inclusion of income from any relative, except
that of a parent or spouse, in the calculation
of a child applicant's eligibility for medicaid benefits is clear, imequivocal, and unambiguous on its face and is therefore not
subject to judicial construction.

2.

Whether the legislative history of 42 U.S.C.
§1396a(a) (17) (D) fails to support the Executive Director's contention that the statute
allows the unrestricted inclusion of income
within a nuclear family in the determination
of medicaid eligibility.

3. Whether the legislative history of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 shows that it was
intended to revise only AFDC eligibility
standards and not Medicaid eligibility rules.
4. Whether the interpretive authority of the
U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services
is not absolute and may not be use to construe
any statute so as to circumvent a prohibition
clearly stated by Congress, nor construe it
in a way which violates the Secretary's own
regulations.
5.

Whether unamended federal law continues to
bar deeming of Social Security Old Age
Disability and Survivors benefits, paid
through a representative paysf in a manner
which would attribute them as being available to a medicaid applicant who is not
the actual beneficiary of those benefits.
4

DETERMINATIVE LAW
42 U.S.C. §1396a(a) (17(D):
A State plan for medical assistance must...
include reasonable standards (which shall be
comparable for all groups and may, in accordance with standards prescribed by the
Secretary, differ with respect to income
levels, but only in the case of applicants
or recipients of assistance under the plan
who are not receiving aid or assistance
under any plan of the State approved under
title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title
IV, [42 USCS §§301 et seq., 1201 et seq.,
1351 et seq., 1381 et seq.], based on the
variations between shelter costs in urban
areas and in rural areas) for determining
eligibility for and the extent of medical
assistance under the plan which... do not
take into account the financial responsibility of any individual for any applicant
or recipient of assistance under the plan
unless such applicant or recipient is such
individual's spouse or such individual's
child who is under 21 or (with respect to
States eligibile to participate in the
State program established under title XVI
[42 USCS §§1381 et seq.]), is blind or
permanently and totally disabled, or is
blind or disabled as defined in section 1614
[42 USCS § 1382c] (with respect to States
which are not eligible to participate in
such program); and provide for flexibility
in the application of such standards with
respect to income by taking into account,
except to the extent prescribed by the
Secretary, the costs (whether in the form
of insurance premiums or otherwise) incurred
for medical care or for any other type of
remedial care recognized under State law;...
42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(17)(B):
A State plan for medical assistance must...
include reasonable standards (which shall be
comparable for all groups and may, in accordance with standards prescribed by the
Secretary, differ with respect to income
levels, but only in the case of applicants
or recipients of assistance under the plan
5

who are not receiving aid or assistance
under any plan of the State approved under
title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title
IV, [42 USCS §§301 et seq., 1201 et seq.,
1351 et seq., 1381 et seq.], based on the
variations between shelter costs in urban
areas and in rural areas) for determining
eligibility for and the extent of medical
assistance under the plan which... provide
for taking into account only such income
and resources as are, as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the
Secretary, available to the applicant or
recipient and (in the case of any applicant
or recipient who would, except for income
and resources, be eligible for aid or
assistance in the form of money payments
under any plan of the State approved under
title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of
title IV [42 USCS §§301 et seq., 1201 et
seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et seq., 601 et
seq.,], or to have paid with respect to
him supplemental security income benefits
under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.])
as would not be disregarded (or set aside
for future needs) in determining his elibility for such aid, assistance, or bener in S ,....
42 U.S.C. §602(a)(38):
A State plan for aid and service to needy
families with children must- ...
(38) provide that in making the determination
under paragraph (7) with respect to a dependent child and applying paragraph (8), the
State agency shall (except as otherwise provided in this part [42 USCS §§601 et seq.])
include(A) any parent of such child, and
(B) any brother or sister of such child, if
such brother or sister meets the conditions
described in clauses (1) and (20 of section
406(a) [42 USCS §606(a)], if such parent,
brother, or sister is living in the same
home as the dependent child, and any incomo
of or available for such parent, brother, or
sister shall be included in making such determination and applying such paragraph with
6

respect to the family (notwithstanding section 205(j) [42 USCS §405 (j)]f in the case
of benefits provided under title II [42 USCS
§§401 et seq.]); and
42 C.F.R. §435.113:
The agency must provide Medicaid to individuals who would be eligible for AFDC
except for an eligibility requirement used
in that program that is specifically prohibited under title XIX.
42 U.S.C. §405(j)(l) and (2):
(1) When it appears to the Secretary that the interest of an applicant entitled to a payment would
be served thereby, certification of payment may be
made, regardless of the legal competency or incompetency of the individual entitled thereto, either
for direct payment to such applicant, or for his use
and benefit to a relative or some other person.
(2) Any certification made under paragraph (1) for
payment to a person other than the individual entitled to such payment must be made on the basis of
an investigation, carried out either prior to such
certification or within forty-five days after such
certification, and on the basis of adequate evidence
that such certification is in the interest of the
individual entitled to such payment (as determined
by the Secretary in regulations). The Secretary
shall insure that such certification are adequately
reviewed.
42 U.S.C. §408(e):
Whoever... (e) having made application to receive
payment under this title for the use and benefit of
another and having received such a payment,
knowingly and willfully converts such a payment,
or any party thereof, to a use other than for
the use and benefit of such other person; ...
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction
thereof shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In the Appellee1s Response Brief, the Executive Director
of the Department of Health argues that the legislative histories
of

42

U.S.C.

1396a(a)(17) (D) and the Deficit Reduction Act of

1984 (P.L 98-369,
intended

§2640f

"DEFRA" below) indicate that

to permit the deeming of income from persons other than

spouses or parents in determining Medicaid

eligibility,

the contrary language of subsection (17)(D).
ment

Congress

ignores

the

well-established

rule

despite

However, this argu-

that

when

a federal

statute is clear, unambiguous and unequivocal on its face, courts
are barred from engaging in judicial construction of the
and

will

not

meaning.
statute,

examine

Subsection

its legislative history to ascertain its
(17)(D)

presents

such

an

unambiguous

for it clearly prohibits the deeming of income from any

individual but a spouse or parent.
urged

by

the

The

judicial

construction

Executive Director is therefore inappropriate and

section 1396a(a)(17)(D) must be enforced according to
terms.

statute

If

this enforcement is made,

Final Determination,

its

plain

the Executive Directorfs

which deemed sibling income as available to

Jerry Grandson, is rendered invalid.
The legislative history of section 1396a (a) (17) (D) does
not,

in

any event,

support the Executive Directorfs contention

that all "nuclear family" income may be deemed as available to an
applicant for Medicaid.
legislative

history

All

courts

which

have

examined

the

of the section have concluded that Congress

simply had no intention to allow the inclusion of income fiom any
8

individual other than a spouse or parent.

The legislative

his-

tory is entirely consistent with the plain prohibition of section
1396a(a)(17)(D).
The legislative history of the Deficit Reduction Act of
1984

does

not

support

the

Medicaid eligibility rules.
analyzed

the

legislative

argument

that

Once againf
history

of

it somehow amended

all courts which
DEFRA

conclude

modified only AFDC eligibility rules, and they
that

have

that it

refuse

to

find

DEFRA was intended to alter the express prohibition of sec-

tion 1396a(a)(17)(D) which governs Medicaid eligibility.
The Executive Director then argues
prohibitions

created

that, despite

the

by the plain language and legislative his-

tories of these statutes, the U.S.

Secretary of Health and Human

Services has interpreted them so as to allow the prohibited deeming

and

this interpretation must be accorded legislative effect

and great deference.
Secretary's

This argument ignores the

interpretative

pronouncements

rule

that

the

are only entitled to

legislative effect if they do not exceed his statutory authority.
Nor are these interpretations entitled to great deference if they
violate the Secretary's own
courts

have

found

that

regulations.

And,

in

fact, the

section 1396a (a) (17) (D) is a statutory

limitation on

the

Secretary's

interpretative

renders void,

rather than giving legislative effect to, his rule

permitting the deeming of income from individuals
spouse

or parent.

In the same vein,

authority

other

which

than

a

the courts have held that

the Secretary's own regulation, 42 C.F.R. §435.113, which states
9

that

Medicaid

may

not

be

denied

as a consequence of an AFDC

eligibility requirement prohibited by the Medicaid statute, also
places

a constraint on the Secretary's interpretative authority.

In short, the Secretary's interpretation carries no weight here.
Finally,
rule

prior to DEFRA there

was

well-recognized

that benefits paid through a representative payee,

Aid To Families With Dependent Children or
Age

a

Disability

And Survivors Insurance,

the actual beneficiary,

Social

such as

Security

Old

could only be used for

and any eligibility determination

which

assumed that income to be available to another person was invalid
as

a

consequence.

The

Executive

Director argues that DEFRA

removed this ban in regard to AFDC eligibility and,
and

Medicaid eligibility rules are identical,

be lifted in regard to Medicaid benefits paid
sentative

payee.

Jerry

because AFDC

the ban must also
through

a

repre-

Grandson agrees that the ban may have

been removed in AFDC cases, though the courts differ on this conclusion. What is clear is that, once again,

DEFRA applies only

to AFDC eligibility and, by its plain terms, removed the ban only
in AFDC cases.
are separate,

In addition, AFDC and Medicaid eligibility rules
rather than identical,

so it does not necessarily

follow that specific removal of a general prohibition,
plies to AFDC,
cases,

as it ap-

also works to remove that prohibition in Medicaid

or indeed, any other case involving benefits paid through

a representative payee.

10

ARUGMENT
I.

THE FEDERAL STATUTE WHICH BARS THE INCLUSION
OF INCOME FROM ANY RELATIVE, EXCEPT THAT OF A
PARENT OR SPOUSE, IN THE CALCULATION OF A CHILD
APPLICANT'S ELIGIBILITY FOR MEDICAID BENEFITS
IS CLEAR, UNEQUIVOCAL, AND UNAMBIGUOUS ON ITS
FACE AND IS THEREFORE NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL
CONSTRUCTION.

In Points I, II, and III of the Respondent's Brief, the
Executive

Director

of the Department of Health argues that this

case may only be resolved through statutory
U.S.C.

§1396a(a)(17)(D)

account

the

another

individual, other

child,
of

financial

(which

of

a

of

any

individual

for

spouse or parent of a minor

in Medicaid eligibility determinations) and section

the

42

bars the State from taking into

responsibility
than

construction

2640

Deficit Reduction Act (which permits such deeming of in-

come in determining eligibility for the
pendent Children program).
argues

that

the

Aid To Families With De-

The Executive Director

specifically

legislative history of section 17(D) indicates

that it was intended to remove the burden

of

financial

respon-

sibility of adult children for elderly parents, that Congress intended

minor

children to be included in a nuclear family filing

unit thus permitting the Secretary of Health and
to

deem

the

income

filing unit and,
would

change

of

finally,

Human

Services

minor children to be available to that
that Congress was

aware

that

DEFRA

Medicaid eligibility and desired this result so as

to re-allocate scarce public resources.
The Executive Director leaps into this
struction

statutory

con-

without first examining whether such interpretation is
11

warranted by the canons of construction.
the

primary canons,

Howeverr

under one of

such construction is rendered inappropriate

in the present case.
It is a

well-established

statute is clear, unambiguous,

rule

that

when

a

federal

and unequivocal on its face, the

courts are barred from engaging in judicial construction

of

the

statute and will not examine its legislative history to ascertain
its meaning.

Rubin v.

United States (1981) 449 U.S.

T.V.A. v. Hill (1978) 437 U.S. 153,
(1949) 337 U.S.55,
534, 536; see.

61; Miles v.

184 n.29;

Ex Parte Collette

Wells (1900) 22 Utah 55, 61 P.

Board of Education v.

Salt Lake County (1983) Utah,

424, 430;

Granite School District v.

659 P.2d 1030, 1035.

States Supreme Court has given a rationale for

this

The United
rule.

In

Gemsco Inc. v. Walling (1945) 324 U.S. 244, the Court observed
[t]he plain words and meaning of a statute
cannot be overcome by a legislative history
which, through strained processes of deduction from events of wholly ambiguous significance, may furnish dubious bases for inference in every direction.
I£., at p.260.
This

rule of construction supplies the short answer to

the Executive Director's arguments
Section

1396a(a)(17)(D)

plainly,

regarding
clearly,

statutory
and

intent.

unambiguously

states that
[a] State plan for medical assistance must ...
include reasonable standards ... for determining eligibility ... which ... do not take into
account the financial responsibility of any
individual for any applicant or recipient of
12

assistance ... unless such applicant or recipient
is such individual's spouse or such individuals
child who is under 21....(Emphasis supplied)
The statute only permits deeming of income from
parents of minor children.

or

the

By its clear terms it bars the deem-

ing of income from grandparents,
tives.

spouses

siblings, or any

other

rela-

Any argument which attempts to broaden the scope of the

statute by permitting the accounting

of

the

financial

respon-

sibility of individuals other than a spouse or parent must necessarily ignore the plain language of section 17(D).
which attempts to circumvent this plain language,
cial

Any argument
through

judi-

construction of the statute based upon legislative history,

also necessarily ignores the canon of construction
interpretation.
The

barring

Such a result is impermissable.

Courts

which

have

already considered this issue

uniformly agree that section 17(D) is plain and unambiguous.
Vance v.

such

In

Hegstrom (9th Cir. 1986) 793 F.2d 1018, the Court noted

that
...the plain language of subsection (17)(D)
explicitly prohibits the deeming of income
from persons other than a Medicaid applicant's
spouse, or a parent in the case of a child
who is under twenty-one, blind or permanently
and totally disabled. There is no clearly
expressed legislative intent to the contrary.
Id. at p. 1024. Other courts have reached similar holdings which
find that the unequivocal language of
bars

the

deeming

section

17(D)

absolutely

of income from persons other than a spouse or

parent of a minor child.

Reed v. Blinzinger (S.D. Ind. 1986) 639

13

F. Supp. 130, 134; Olson v.
154,

159

["...both

the

Reagen (S.D. Iowa 1986) 631 F.Supp.

clear

language of the statute and the

legislative history indicate that it is impermissible ... to deem
available to the filing unit income from relatives other
spouse or the parent of a minor child."];
Tenn. 1985) 630 F. Supp. 542f

Gibson v.

than

a

Puett (M.D.

544-545 [Deeming of sibling income

in determining Medicaid eligibility is specifically prohibited by
section 1396a(a) (17) (D);]; Malloy v. Eichler (D.Del. 1986) 628 F.
Supp.

582, 593-594, 598

[Plain

language

of the Medicaid Act

limits the Secretary's authority to deem income as available only
from a parent or spouse,
Mansour

(W.D. Mich.

and not from a sibling.];

1986) 627 F.Supp.

Sundberg

616, 620 ["...section

1396a (a)(17) (D) prohibits the Secretary from requiring states
consider

sibling

income

and

resources

v.

in making

to

medicaid

eligibility determinations."].
Given the clarity of the prohibition contained in section 1396a(a)(17)(D), it would be inappropriate for this Court to
engage in a judicial construction of the statute as the Executive
Director urges.

Rather, the canons of construction require that

the statute be enforced according to its plain meaning.
enforcement
mination,
sion,

is made

then the Executive Director's Final Deter-

and Judge Bunnell's decision in upholding

must

be

If such

that

deci-

held to have violated the unambiguous dictate of

the statute.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 1396a
(a)(17)(D) DOES NOT SUPPORT THE EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR'S CONTENTION THAT IT ALLOWS THE
14

UNRESTRICTED INCLUSION OF INCOME WITHIN A
NUCLEAR FAMILY.
In Point I of her Brief,

the Executive Director argues

that the legislative history of section 1396a(a)(17)(D) indicates
that

Congress only enacted the statute to prevent adult children

from

being

saddled

with

financial

responsibility

for

their

elderly parents. The Executive Director concludes thatf whatever
the language of the statute, Congress intended that the income of
minor

children

would

be counted in eligibility determinations.

However, the Executive Director does admit that "...

there is no

indication

that Congress has ever considered the income of minor

children.11

Respondent's Brief at p.11.

The
simply

legislative

history

of

section

1396a(a) (17)(D)

does not support the Executive Director's position.

courts have focused upon the Congressional

intent

indicated

the following report extract:
The committee has heard of hardships on
certain individuals by requiring them to
provide support and to pay for the medical
care needed by relatives. The committee
believes it is proper to expect spouses
to support each other and parents to be
held accountable for the support of their
minor children and their blind or permanently and totally disabled children even
though 21 years of age or older. Such rerequirements for support may reasonably
include the payment by such relative, if
able, for medical care. Beyond such degree of relationship, however, requirements
imposed are often destructive and harmful
to the relationship among members of the
family group. Thus, States may not include in their plans provisions for reguifing contributions frorn^xelatives
other than 3 spouse oc the parent of a
15

The
by

minor child or children over 21 who are
blind or permanently and totally disabled.
S.Rep.

404,

89th Cong.,

1st Sess. 78 (Finance Committee) (June

30, 1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.Code Cong.
2018;

H.Rep.

No.

& Ad.News 1943 1943,

213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (Ways and Means

Committee) (March 29, 1965) [emphasis added].
In Malloy v. Eichler(supra) 628 F.Supp. at pp. 594-595,
the federal District Court stated that this provision showed a
...desire to prevent family discord [which]
cannot be limited to cases where an adult
child must support a geriatric parent. The
Secretary's argument that such a shackle
should be placed on Congressional symphathy
is not supported by the legislative history
which makes it clear "beyond doubt that Congress was wary of imputing the income of
others to a Medicaid applicant." Schweiker
v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. at 47, 101 S.Ct.
at 2642 (emphasis added). Only the income of
spouses and parents was thought to be a reasonable exception to the actual availability
principle.
Accord, Vance v. Hegstrom (supra) 793 F.2d at p.1024 ["The legislative history refers only to a spouse, or the parent of a minor
child, or the parent of children over twenty-one who are blind or
permanently

and totally disabled,

"nuclear family".];
pp.

Sundberg v.

and does not include the term

Mansour (supra) 627 F.Supp.

at

620-621 ["As the Supreme Court has recognized, Congress thus

decided to treat spouses (and
relatives

in

determining

applicants and recipient*

parents)

differently

than

other

the financial eligibility of Medicaid
[citation]

[Par.] There is no indica-

tion, however, that Congress intended to include siblings...."].
16

There is no support in the legislative history of
tion

1396a(a)(17)(D)

sec-

for the Executive Director's argument that

she may include sibling income in her medicaid eligibility determinations.

Rather, the history underscores the plain language of

the statute which bars such inclusions.

III.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DEFICIT
REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 ONLY SUPPORTS A
VIEW THAT IT WAS INTENDED TO REVISE
AFDC ELIGIBILITY STANDARDS BUT NOT MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY RULES.

In Point III of her Brief,

the Executive Director con-

tends that Congress, when it enacted DEFRA, was cognizant of the
fact that AFDC and Medicaid eligibility determinations are linked
together,

that Congress desired

resources through DEFRA,
changed

Medicaid

eligibility.

to

re-allocate

scarce

public

and that Congress must have intended to

eligibility

simultaneously

with

AFDC

However, the courts which have examined the legis-

lative history of DEFRA have rejected this argument.
In a very

well-reasoned

holding,

the

Ninth

Circuit

Court of Appeals stated, in Vance v. Hegstrom (supra) 793 F.2d at
pp. 1024 - 1025, that
The Secretary also contends that his definition of a Medicaid filing unit is consistent with Congress's reason for passing
DEFRA, which was to reduce spending in
light of a huge federal deficit. [citation]
The Secretary relies on statements made by
members of Congress, and statements made in
Congressional staff reports, that changes
in the AFDC filing unit would result in
decreases in the number of children receiving Medicaid, thus suggesting Congress
17

recognized a change in the AFDC filing unit

view that changes in A F D C WQVtld also efr.
feet Medicaid eligibility. They are not
statements of what Congress intended when
it passed DEFRA. The statute finally enacted by Congress which required states
to include sibling income_when determining
AFDC eligibility is directed solely to the
provisions of 42 U.S.C. S 602, which is a
component of the AFDC statute, and not to
subsection (17)(D). We must assume that
Congress was aware of subsection (17)(D)
when it enacted the AFDC amendments, could
have amended subsection (17)(D), and chose not
to do so. [citation] (emphasis supplied.)
Accord,

Malloy

v.

Eichler (supra) 628 F.Supp.

["...the legislative history is ...
the

at pp.

silent about any

purpose of subsection (17)(D) ....

because it reduced the availability of AFDC."];

F.Supp

at

p.134

at p.159;
["The

Reed v.

evidence

is

U.S.C.

in

assistance

Olson v.

Blinzinger

Reagan

(supra)

639

insufficient to find that

Congress intended for §2640 to modify the express
42

change

[Par.] [and] [t]he Court

cannot presume that Congress intended to cut Medicaid

(supra) 631 F.Supp.

596-597

provisions

of

§1396a(a)(17)(D) and allow the income of a sibling to

be assumed available to a Medicaid applicant."].
There is nothing contained in the

legislative

history

of DEFRA which suggests that Congress intended to alter the unambiguous dictate of §1396a (a) (17) (D).
18

Taken together, the legis-

lative histories of that statute and DEFRA will only
application

of

an

of section 17(D) which bars the inclusion of sibling

income in a Medicaid eligibility determination.
ing

support

The plain mean-

section of section 17(D) is reinforced by examination of

the legislative histories.
Director's

As

a

consequence,

the

Executive

decision to circumvent the prohibition of the section

rendered her Final Determination legally invalid.
IV. STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS MADE BY THE U.S.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES ARE
NOT ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE OR LEGISLATIVE
EFFECT WHERE THOSE INTERPRETATIONS VIOLATE
CLEAR CONGRESSIONAL PROHIBITIONS AND THE
SECRETARY'S OWN REGULATIONS.
In Point II of her Brief,
tends

that

the Executive Director

con-

by interpreting sibling income as being income which

is "available"

(under

§1396a(a)(17)(B))

to

a

nuclear

family

filing unit, the Secretary of Health and Human Services is making
an

administrative determination which is entitled to legislative

effect.

And in Point V,

the Executive Director argues that such

interpretations must, in addition, be accorded great deference by
the courts. However, whatever the authority of the Secretary, it
is

certainly

not

absolute

and

statutes in a manner which avoids
prohibition.

The

cannot
an

be

used

unequivocal

to interpret
Congressional

Secretary may also not use this authority to

violate his own regulations.
The former principle is best illustrated by a case much
cited by the Executive Director:
(1981) 453 U.S.

34.

Schweiker

v.

Gray

Panthers

In that case, the Supreme Court held that
19

the Secretary's definition of the term

"available"

determinations) is entitled to legislative effect.

(for

income

M . , at p.44.

But this does not render the Secretary's power absoluter
courts may review his definitions to determine whether
made

in

The

Court

they

a manner which exceeds his statutory authority.
noted

"available"

by

that
the

spousal

Secretary

income

could

Court

be

Ibid.

deemed

44-49.

emphasized that this result was possible only because

relatives1

other

as

However,

of the clear distinction between spousal deeming and the
of

are

because such attribution was not

barred by section 1396a(a)(17)(D). Id. at pp.
the

and the

1396a(a) (17) (D).

deeming

income which Congress had drawn in section

The tenor of the holding strongly suggests that

if the Secretary attempted deeming of

other

relatives'

income,

such deeming would exceed the Secretary's statutory authority and
his

definition

would

not

be entitled to legislative effect or

deference from the courts.
Andf
sibling

indeed,

the courts which have examined deeming of

and other relatives' income in Medicaid cases have found

that it is done in excess of the Secretary's statutory
and

is therefore impermissible.

Vance v.

F.2d at p.1024 ["Although the Secretary has

authority

Hegstrom (supra) 793
been

granted

broad

authority under subsection (17)(B) to prescribe standards setting
eligibility

requirements

for State Medicaid plans,

the Secretary's statutory authority
structuring

a

is

not

[citation],

unlimited

....

In

Medicaid filing unit by defining it in such a way

as to include sibing income, the Secretary is doing through sub20

section

(17)(B)

that which he is expressly precluded from doing

by subsection (17) (D)."]; Reed v.
at

p.134

["The

Blinzinger (supra) 639 F.Supp.

Secretary's interpretation of [DEFRA] conflicts

with the Medicaid statute, regulations,
of the Medicaid Act.

[ ] Therefore,

tion is not controlling....11];
Supp.

at

and congressional intent

the Secretary's interpreta-

Olson v.

Reagen (supra)

631

159 [The deeming sought by the Secretary is "...

F.

con-

trary to the Congressional intent to limit that responsibility to
spouses and parents.
her

statutory

F.Supp.

It follows that the Secretary has exceeded

authority

at p.

..."];

598) ["...

Malloy v.

Eichler (supra) 628

the use of section 2640 of

DEFRA

to

determine Medicaid eligibility contravenes the mandate of subsection (17)(D) of Title XIX.

The Secretary's views do not deserve

legislative effect or substantial weight because they are
inconsistent

with

the

legislative

statutes involved.]; Sundberg v.

wholly

and judicial history of the

Mansour (supra) 627 F.Supp.

at

p.620.
The

Secretary

is

also

prohibited

from

making

a

statutory interpretation which violates his own regulations, for
those regulations have the force of law until properly amended or
repealed.
Flores v.
sibling

Vance

v.

Hegstrom

(supra) 793 F.Supp.

Bowen (1986 9th Cir.) 790 F.2d 740, 742.
income

as

at p.1025;
By deeming

available in Medicaid eligibility determina-

tions, the Secretary does violate a valid regulation.
Section 453.113, Title 42, of
Regulations, states
21

the

Code

of

Federal

The agency must provide Medicaid to individuals who would be eligible for AFDC
except for an eligibility requirement used
in that program that is specifically prohibited under title XIX.
The significance of the regulation is apparent. AFDC eligibility
rules

which

permit deeming of sibling income may not be used to

determine Medicaid eligibility because that kind
specifically

of

deeming

is

prohibited by section 1396a (a) (17) (D) of Title XIX.

That regulation is binding on the Secretary and he may
cumvent it through statutory interpretation.

Vance v.

not

cir-

Hegstrom

(supra) 793 F.2d at p. 1025.
The Secretary's interpretations of DEFRA and subsection
(17) (D) are
deference

not

entitled

because

his

to

either

legislative

interpretations

exceed

or

his

judicial
statutory

authority and ignore his own validf unrepealed regulations.
Executive

The

Director's reliance upon this interpretative authority

is therefore erroneous and renders her

Final

Determination

ar-

bitrary and capricious.

V. UNAMENDED FEDERAL STATUTES CONTINUE TO
BAR DEEMING OF SOCIAL SECURITY OLD AGE
DISABILITY AND SURVIVORS BENEFITS PAID
THROUGH A REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE.
In

Part

II

of the Appellant's Brief,

pointed out that federal statutes and
Social

regulation

required

that

Security benefits paid through a representative payee for

a third person may only be applied to that
and

Jerry Grandson

that

violations

of

this

third

person's

use,

restriction constitute a federal

22

felony.
Brief

42 U.S.C. §405(j)(l) and (2); 42 U.S.C.

also

§408(e).

The

discussed pre-DEFRA cases which held that deeming of

such income was prohibited by these regulations in the determination of AFDC eligibility.

Even after the passage of DEFRAr

the

courts are divided as to whether this bar has been lifted in AFDC
cases.

Finally,

Jerry Grandson noted that, even if DEFRA had

removed this bar in AFDC cases, DEFRA was

strictly

limited

to

amending AFDC eligibility rules and could not be seen as removing
the

representative

payee deeming bar as it relates to any other

benefits payments, such as Social Security Survivor's benefits.
The Executive Director's response (in Point IV
Brief)

is twofold:

first,

eligibility

her

she reiterates that courts have held

the representative payee deeming bar to be
AFDC

of

determinations;

lifted

second,

by

because

DEFRA
AFDC

in
and

Medicaid eligibility standards are identical, as argued elsewhere
in her Brief,
necessarily

removal of the bar on such deeming in

works the same result in Medicaid cases.

contention misses the point of the

appellant's

AFDC

cases

The first

discussion, and

the second contention is merely wrong.
Section 2640 of DEFRA may have removed the bar on deeming representative payee income in AFDC cases.

However,

as was

discussed in the Appellant's Brief and the preceeding sections of
this Reply,
DEFRA

the courts have been uniform in their holdings

applies

Security Act.
courts

have

only

to the AFDC eligibility rules of the Social

Thus,
found

that

the fact that some, most, or

the

even

all,

representative payee bar lifted in AFDC
23

eligibility determinations does not effect Medicaid cases.
these

authorities

But

do show that there was a recognized bar which

had to be lifted through actual Congressional action.
The Executive Director finds the
by

Congressional

action

reconcilling AFDC and Medicaid eligibility requirments.

The

extent of this argument is a statement that
[b]ecause the Medicaid agency must apply
the financial eligibility requirements of
the AFDC program [citation]r the removal
of this bar logically extends to the
Medicaid program as well.
Appellee's Response Brief at p.22.
The preceeding sections
demonstrated

the

invalidity

Director's statement.
are

not identical.

a

already

of the Executive
eligibility

rules

by

section

DEFRA may have amended Title IIf but it had
If the linkage of eligibility rules does
separate

sets

of

rules, then

bar or prohibition applicable to one set of rules

does not remove that bar as to the
Director's

premise

have

and Medicaid is controlled

not exist, but instead we find
of

the

Brief

AFDC eligibility is governed by Title II of

no effect on Title XIX.

removal

of

this

The AFDC and Medicaid

the Social Security Act,
1396a of Title XIX.

of

statement

is

other

fallacious

and

set.
does

The
not

Executive
suggest

legitimate ground for abolition of the prohibition on deeming

a
of

representative payee OADSI benefits in Medicaid cases.
By its terms, section 2640 of DEFRA has removed the bar
against

deeming representative

payee OADSI income in AFDC cases

24

only.

But there is nothing in DEFRA or its legislative

which

history

suggests that Congress intended to remove this bar for any

other kinds of benefits paid through a representative payee. Because Jerry Grandson's

siblings received their

Social

Security

Survivor's benefits through a representative payee, the Executive
Director's

Final

Determination

violated federal lav/ by deeming

this income as being available to Jerry.
CONCLUSION
In her Brief,

the Executive Director of the Department

of Health argues that this case may only be resolved by examining
the

legislative histories of 42 U.S.C.

Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.
reveal

Congress'

intent

§1396a(a)(17)(D) and the

Such an examination is

said

to

to permit deeming of sibling income in

determining Medicaid eligibility,

despite the clear

prohibition

of section 1396a(a)(17)(D) which bars such deeming unless the income

is from a spouse or parent of a minor child.

In addition,

the Executive Director argues that such deeming is based
statutory

interpretation

by

the

U.S.

upon

a

Secretary of Health and

Human Services, and this interpretation must be

accorded

great

deference and legislative effect.

Finally, the Executive Direc-

tor argues that a ban

deeming

of

payee

must

through

a

on

representative

benefit
be

income

removed

Security Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance

for

received
Social

benefits

if

Congress removed it for AFDC benefits.
In

reply, Jerry

Grandson

has

canons of statutory construction render it
25

pointed

out that the

inappropriate

for

a

court

to

engage

in the judicial construction of an unambiguous

statute through examination of its legislative history.

Section

1396a(a) (17) (D) fits this rule for it clearly bans the deeming of
income

from

any

minor child.

individual

other than a spouse of parent of a

Thus the statute is entitled to be enforced in ac-

cordance with its plain terms.
Such

enforcement would be consistent with the legisla-

tive histories of the statutes in any event.
consistently

found

The

courts

have

that Congress intended to bar all deeming of

income from any persons other than spouses or parents in Medicaid
eligibility

determinations

1396a(a) (17) (D).

through

the

enactment

section

The courts also find no evidence that Congress

intended to change this rule through enactment
they

of

of

DEFRA,

which

instead find was concerned solely with eligibility for AFDC

benefits.
Finally,

there is also no evidence

that

the

bar

on

deeming of representative payee income has been waived in any but
AFDC

cases.

The statute removing that ban for AFDC eligibility

determinations refers only to AFDC and not to any
program.

As

a

consequence,

other

benefit

the bar must remain in place for

other programs, such as Social Security Survivors benefits.
Because there are no appropriate arguments which
the

deeming

of

sibling

income

in

determining

Medicaid

eligibility, the Executive Director's Final Determination,
did

allow

which

allow such deeming, violated federal and state statutes and

regulations.

Her decision was therefore arbitrary and capricious
26

and deserved to be reversed.

The failure of the District

Court

to take that action was an error of law.
Date:<

3<? <kuvL/<?X?

1%d>r-

Steven Boos
DNA-PEOPLE'S LEGAL SERVICES
Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
Note:

House Report No. 213 is fully
reproduced at Item No. 11 in
the addenda of the Appellee's
Response Brief, and is not
reproduced again here.
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